We consider effects of strategic speculation on expected returns in a noisy rational expectations equilibrium for the large economy limit of a set of finite economies in which all traders consider their impact on price. In our model, a large, informed trader profits from exploiting private information, and from capturing some of the systematic risk premium by covering the demands of noise traders. Similar to the case of competitive informed traders, we show that factor loadings (betas) explain all cross-sectional differences in expected returns. In contrast to the case with competitive informed traders, we show that private information increases the expected returns required by uninformed traders. While informative prices allow uninformed investors to glean some of the large trader's information, a privately informed large trader diminishes her absorption risk, which dominates the effect of informative prices and leads to higher factor risk premiums. In other words, asymmetric information does not create a new, priced risk factor, but does impact the pricing of systematic payoff risks. An implication of the results in the large economy limit is that firm-specific accounting is likely to affect firm value only through cash flow (numerator) effects.
Introduction
Accounting research has devoted considerable interest to the effects of asymmetric information on expected returns. Prior theoretical studies show that, in economies comprised of perfectly competitive traders who can fully diversify their holdings, asymmetric information only affects expected returns via its impact on premia for systematic risks (Hughes et al. 2007; Lambert et al. 2007 ). In particular, cross-sectional differences in factor loadings (betas) explain any cross-sectional differences in expected returns. 1 In a CARA/normal setting, the premium for systematic risk depends on the average precision of traders' beliefs (Hughes et al. 2007; Lambert et al. 2012 ). Compared to a no-information benchmark, asymmetric information reduces expected returns by increasing the average precision of traders' beliefs. For a given set of informative signals, expected returns are higher if a subset of traders observes them privately, because uninformed traders only observe a noisy version of private information via prices.
We examine whether similar results hold when modeling the economy as the limit of finite economies in which traders participate in imperfectly competitive markets, and therefore take into account the price impact of their trades. In addition, we develop new insights into how private information impacts returns. Our study relates to Lambert at al. (2012) , who consider a finite economy where imperfectly competitive informed traders interact with an unbounded number of perfectly competitive uninformed investors. We derive an equilibrium that can be viewed as a multi-asset extension of Kyle (1989) , where both informed and uninformed investors consider their impact on price. We then take large economy limits in order to distinguish between idiosyncratic and systematic risks, and to approximate the behavior of developed stock markets where a large number of traders exchange shares in a large number of securities.
Before examining economies with imperfect competition, we apply the results from Chamberlain (1983) and Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983) to show that the pricing of only systematic risk holds under very weak conditions, once one has assumed perfect competition among uninformed traders. We also show that a factor representation of risk entails virtually no loss of generality. This general setting does not address whether the economy represents the limit of finite economies comprised of imperfectly competitive traders, nor does it demonstrate whether or not information asymmetry creates a distinct systematic risk. We therefore develop a CARA/normal model to explore these two issues, and to more fully characterize expected returns and trading behavior. In the CARA/normal setting, we first derive a finite-economy equilibrium.
We then take limits with respect to the numbers of uninformed traders and assets. Last, assuming price taking by uninformed traders in the limit and finite assets, we derive closed-form solutions for several special cases.
In order to show the maximum impact of imperfect competition among informed traders, we model the informed trader as a risk-neutral monopolist who can observe prices (i.e., places limit orders as in Kyle 1989) . 2 The informed trader plays two roles in our model: she exploits private information and provides liquidity to noise traders in order to capture the systematic risk premium. Risk neutrality maximizes the informed trader's incentive for information-based trades, but also positions her to capture a larger portion of the systematic risk premium. Sans exploitation of private information, she absorbs half of the liquidity demand as the profit maximizing quantity. Otherwise, as in Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2012) , she curbs her demands to limit the revelation of her private information to uninformed traders 3 and, by doing 2 A risk-averse informed trader yields qualitatively similar results in a finite economy so long as risk aversion is not too large. The similarity stems from the fact that the uninformed traders drive the unconditional expected returns. Risk-neutrality becomes crucial in the large economy limit because no trader with finite risk tolerance will bear a non-negligible amount of systematic risk in the limiting large economy. 3 Their model assumes a finite number of informed traders who anticipate the effect of their demands on price and so, absorbs less of the liquidity demand and, hence, less of the systematic risk. In turn, uninformed traders bear greater systematic risk for which they require a higher expected return.
Information asymmetry does not create a separate risk factor; rather, it increases systematic risk premia by reducing the large trader's willingness to bear risk. 4 Diversification by uninformed traders plays a key role in driving our large economy predictions on expected returns. In the limit, uninformed traders diversify and trades in a given security represent a small fraction of an individual uninformed trader's portfolio and a small fraction of overall trade in the security. This causes uninformed traders to behave as price takers. At the margin, prices depend on diversified uninformed traders' demands and, therefore, include risk premiums only for non-diversifiable risk. If, at the margin, an uninformed trader were to infer that an individual asset is mispriced, he could initiate small trades in that security without affecting his overall risk exposure due to local risk-neutrality. Because all uninformed will draw the same inference that the asset is mispriced, all would adjust their demands. In equilibrium, perfect competition among uninformed traders would dissipate any distortions from full diversification.
We develop further insights by considering special cases. When uninformed investors do not learn from price, either because the large trader has no private information or because noise trade is so volatile as to preclude learning from prices, the risk-neutral informed trader absorbs half of the liquidity demands as the profit maximizing share of the systematic risk premium. At an unbounded number of price-taking uninformed traders. They focus on the impact of imperfect competition on price discovery as the relative proportion of traders varies. 4 Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) predict a similar phenomenon in a single-firm setting where expected future market illiquidity increases large traders' expected costs of unwinding large positions. While the settings differ, in both cases, illiquidity increases the risk that must be borne by uninformed traders and drives up expected returns. 5 In principle, uninformed investors could have some undiversified holdings so long as they do not all overweight the same individual stocks. In our model, each firm represents a small fraction of the economy so that a nontrivial fraction of the population can have a undiversified position in a given firm only if other investors take the opposite side of the trade. the other extreme, when the variance of noise trades approaches zero, trading costs become infinitely large and the informed trader only takes infinitesimal positions. 6 After imposing further structure, we predict that the impact of risk-sharing dominates the effect of information revealed through price. In particular, expected returns decrease in the variance of noise trades and expected returns are lower when the large trader, and therefore all traders, learn nothing beyond their prior beliefs based on public information. This contrasts with the case of perfectly competitive informed investors, where the introduction of private information reduces expected returns.
We also predict that noise traders' portfolios play a key role in the pricing of systematic risk. If the informed trader has private information on systematic risks, then she needs to trade in fully diversified portfolios to exploit that information. She can only do so if noise traders also transact in diversified portfolios; otherwise, uninformed traders can infer her trades, similar to zero-noise-trade-variance case. As the variance of noise trades in factor portfolios increases, the informed trader's information-based demands absorb more systematic risks causing expected returns required by uninformed traders to decrease. Even though greater noise trade variance reduces the uninformed traders' learning about systematic risks, expected returns decline. This occurs because the informed trader's larger positions reduce the risk borne by uninformed traders and the corresponding factor risk premium. The effect of the informed trader's absorption of risk again dominates the effect of the information revealed to uninformed traders.
Recent empirical studies by Armstrong, Core, Taylor, and Verrecchia (2011) and Akins, Ng, and Verdi (2012) show a positive association between imperfect competition among informed traders and cost of capital. The theoretical basis is the prediction that when the number 6 We can only examine the zero noise-trade variance case with competitive uninformed investors. The market breaks down if uninformed investors consider their price impact and there is no noise in supply (Kyle 1989, p. 335). of informed traders is small, they trade less aggressively on their private information so as to limit the information that uninformed traders can learn from price. This lowers the average precision of information and increases the risk borne by uninformed traders, which raises cost of capital. In our model, however, returns depend solely on systematic risks, so that any crosssectional variation in expected returns will vanish after controlling for factor loadings. Of course, it is also possible that uninformed investors are not well diversified, in which case firm-specific risks may be priced. This would allow for cross-sectional variations in cost of capital even after controlling for betas. However, this poses a conundrum in that it is unlikely that uninformed traders would irrationally under diversify and, yet, be sufficiently rational to extract information from prices. While not leading to a (within economy) cross-sectional prediction, we note that our model predicts that a decrease in liquidity from noise trades increases marginal trading costs, which leads to higher expected returns as the informed trader absorbs less of the systematic risks, suggesting an alternative direction to empirical inquiries on the effects of imperfect competition.
Another avenue for future empirical inquiries is to consider the extent of uninformed shareholders' diversification when examining the effects of information asymmetries on expected returns. For example, Faccio, Marchica, and Mura (2011) find empirical evidence that firms with shares held by investors with well diversified portfolios care less about firm-specific risk taking. Controlling for betas in such a context, we suggest consideration of numerator, or cash flow, effects as drivers of cross-sectional differences in expected return. For an example in a moral hazard setting, Gao and Verrecchia (2012) show that idiosyncratic risk increases the risk premium paid to managers as part of a performance-based compensation package (a numerator effect), while the expected return to investors (denominator effect) depends entirely on systematic risk.
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In their setting, better firm-specific information reduces premiums required to induce managerial effort, while better economy-wide information reduces systematic risk and, hence, expected return.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 characterizes equilibrium expected returns for the case with minimal structure assuming competitive uninformed traders; section 3 derives equilibrium expected returns and informed demands for the finite and large economy cases; section 4 considers special cases that reinforce insights; and section 5 concludes.
Expected returns in a large economy with competitive uninformed traders
We begin by characterizing equilibrium prices under minimal restrictions on preferences and distributions employing principal components a la Chamberlain (1983) and Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983) . The ensuing analysis establishes the generality of a factor structure for asset payoffs and demonstrates the power of full diversification in eliminating effects of idiosyncratic risks on expected returns, notwithstanding imperfect competition with respect to exploitation of private information. While for purposes of this analysis we assume uninformed traders are competitive, we later show that uninformed traders behave constructively as price takers in the large economy limit given a factor structure and standard assumptions of CARA utility and Normal distributions.
The market consists of N risky assets, each with a payoff given by the random vector v, and traded at an equilibrium price vector p. There is an informed trader with demand vector y and a large number of price-taking, uninformed traders. Each uninformed trader has utility ( ) u  7 Also, see Ou-Yang (2005) for a related moral hazard setting. See Christensen, Feltham, and Wu (2002) for a setting in which the imposition of idiosyncratic risk on managers impacts the rate of return used in residual income compensation metrics, again resulting in numerator effects of idiosyncratic risk. 8 In some cases, concerns over cash flow effects can provide incentives to reduce the information provided by the accounting system. For example, Caskey and Hughes (2012) show that conservative accounting measures, which provide distorted information, have beneficial cash flow effects because they mitigate asset substitution problems in levered firms. In their case, more informative (unbiased) accounting reports can reduce firm value.
that is monotone increasing in wealth and concave. Assuming homogeneity in trading, all uninformed traders have the same demand vector d. Recasting the representative uninformed trader's objective function for a finite number of assets, conditional on whatever information can be inferred from price, we have expected utility of:
which gives the following first-order condition expressed in terms of a pricing kernel with a stochastic discount factor  :
Chamberlain (1983) and Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983) show that under noarbitrage and mild restrictions on the structure of asset payoffs, the conditional variance-
will have an approximate Kfactor structure:
where B is a conditional (on price) N K  covariance matrix for which the nk th element is the covariance of the payoff of asset n and factor k, and e Σ has eigenvalues that remain bounded as the number of assets N   . The matrix e Σ represents risks that remain small relative to the economy as the economy expands. The K factors can be normalized to have a mean zero and variance of one. The following proposition lends a useful perspective on when the restrictions described in the appendix are met including a formal definition of no arbitrage:
If there is no arbitrage and the equally weighted market portfolio has positive, but 9 Given that price is known to the trader, the conditional variance of ( )  v p equals the conditional variance of v.
bounded variance, then | v p
Σ has an approximate factor structure.
Given | v p
Σ has an approximate factor structure, the set of possible portfolios (i.e., linear combinations of net asset payoffs) can be separated into a set of fully diversified portfolios and a set of undiversified portfolios. A portfolio d of an uninformed trader is fully diversified if its weights on individual assets become infinitesimally small in the large economy limit:
The approximate K-factor structure ensures that the unexpected return in any portfolio with payoff ( )   d v p can be decomposed into a fully diversified portfolio that has only systematic (factor) risk due to correlation with the K factors, and an undiversified portfolio that has only idiosyncratic risk and is uncorrelated with both the K factors and the payoff of the fully diversified portfolios. The decomposition follows from a projection theorem similar to a least squares regression in which a dependent variable is decomposable into a predictable component and an orthogonal residual.
Returning to the uninformed trader's first-order conditions, it must be the case that expected returns arise from the covariance of payoffs with the trader's marginal utility:
If the uninformed trader holds a diversified portfolio in equilibrium as we expand the numbers of assets and uninformed traders ( , ) N M   , then the stochastic discount factor only includes the effect of systematic risk on marginal utility: 
where e is a vector of idiosyncratic risks orthogonal to f. Moreover, if e is mean-independent of f, then price can be written as
Our last proposition identifies sufficient conditions for uninformed traders to take fully diversified positions.
Proposition 3:
If noisy supply x and informed trader's demand y are bounded with probability 1, then the uninformed traders' equilibrium portfolio is fully diversified.
It follows from the above propositions that the dependence of expected returns on solely systematic risks holds in fairly general settings. In particular, after controlling for betas, there are no cross-sectional effects on expected returns of imperfect competition with respect to the exploitation of private information. The ability of competitive (price-taking) uninformed traders to fully diversify across a large number of assets in a pure exchange economy ensures that only systematic risks are priced.
While we show that expected returns depend only on systematic risk, the analysis does not rule out information asymmetry creating an additional source of systematic risk. In the next section, we show that the factor pricing results as a limit of finite economies in which investors consider the price impact of their trades. In the resulting equilibrium, information asymmetry does not create a new source of systematic risk, but does impact the price of systematic risk.
Equilibrium in finite and large economies with strategic uninformed traders

Finite economy
Model setup
In this section, we derive a linear equilibrium for asset prices. As in Kyle (1989) , we assume that all traders observe prices when choosing their demands. We assume a payoff structure for N assets as follows:
where v is an N × 1 constant vector, f is a K × 1 vector of mean zero, standard normal random variables, B is an N × K constant matrix, e is an N × 1 vector of zero-mean normal random variables uncorrelated with f and with covariance matrix Σ e , which we assume has bounded eigenvalues.
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This implies that v has the covariance matrix v e    Σ BB Σ .
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The supply of risky assets, net of noise trades, x is a N × 1 vector of normally distributed random variables with mean x , covariance matrix x Σ , and independent of f and e . As we showed in section 2, there is very little loss in generality from assuming a factor model structure for asset payoffs.
We assume that a risk neutral informed trader has private information yielding the posterior belief that v has mean i v and covariance matrix .
joint normally distributed with f, e, and x, is uncorrelated with x, and that the informed trader's posterior does not induce a conditional correlation between f and e. The informed trader places 11 For example, if Σ e is diagonal with bounded elements, then it has bounded eigenvalues. Our assumption of bounded eigenvalues assumes that the Bf term reflects any source of risk shared by a nontrivial fraction of firms. 12 The assumption that f is a vector of standard normal random variables is without further loss of generality because the factors can be recast. 
where, without loss of generality, we have normalized the risk-free rate to equal one and  y p is the opportunity cost of holding those shares.
There are M uninformed traders with CARA utility and risk-aversion A. In deriving a linear equilibrium, we assume that it is common knowledge that the uninformed traders conjecture that the informed trader follows a strategy of the form:
and that the informed trader and traders m m   conjecture that trader m follows a strategy of the form:
These conjectures imply that uninformed trader m's posterior belief about v is normally distributed, allowing us to write the objective function in terms of certainty equivalents:
The market clearing condition is:
Trading strategies
We assume that the informed trader and uninformed trader m optimize against the following two residual supply curves, respectively:
, ,
where i μ ( u μ ) does not depend on y (d m ). Substituting the informed trader's residual supply curve (14) into the objective (9) yields the following two equivalent expressions of the informed trader's first-order condition, ( )
given the second-order condition that i i   Λ Λ is positive definite.
When extracting information from price, uninformed trader m can apply the conjectured uninformed strategy (11) and informed strategy (10) to the market clearing condition (13) to extract a noisy signal s of the informed trader's information i  v v :
This yields the posterior beliefs: 
where p depends on d m , and the second-order condition is
Substituting the conjectured informed strategy (10) and uninformed strategy (11) into the market clearing condition (13), and rearranging yields
where
Equilibrium
The following proposition summarizes the equilibrium:
Proposition 4:
The equilibrium price, expected returns, informed trade, and uninformed trade are: 
Exploitation of information Absorption of average risk
The first expression for price in (19) differs slightly from the expression in (2). With CARA utility and normally distributed beliefs, the adjustment for risk is: information. This can also be written in terms of the two trader types' impacts on prices:
where the absorption depends on the magnitude of informed trader's responsiveness 
Large economy limit
We now derive an equilibrium for a large economy by letting , N M   , with / N M approaching a finite constant which, without loss of generality, we assume to be one. 13 The following proposition characterizes expected returns: 
where B is the N K  matrix of factor loadings and the 1 K  vector of factor risk premia is
It is clear from (25) that information asymmetry affects expected returns only via the factor risk premia (26). This implies that differences in firms' betas explain any cross-sectional variation in expected returns. Information asymmetry also does not create any new factors, but instead impacts the pricing of the systematic components of the firms' fundamental payoffs.
Risk-neutral uninformed traders
A useful special case for characterizing price sensitivities to informed demands in closed form is to assume uninformed traders' are risk neutral; i.e., 0 A  :
Corollary 4.1:
If uninformed traders are risk-neutral, then the following i
Λ satisfies the equilibrium conditions:
which implies the following expected returns and informed trade:
The solution for i Λ resembles the solution from Caballé and Krishnan (1994) .
14 The first term in the informed trade y in (28) reflects the informed trader's average holdings. In the large economy limit, expected returns approach zero and the informed trader bears none of the average supply x . When uninformed traders are risk-averse, the informed trader extracts some of the risk premium by bearing some of the average supply even in the limit.
Further analysis of equilibrium demands and expected returns
Extreme cases of market liquidity with price taking uninformed traders
Price taking by the uninformed enables removal of the price impact matrix, u Λ , from the expressions (19) and (20) for prices and expected returns, and from the equilibrium relation that
This eases the analysis allowing us to examine the impact of noise trade variance as a disguise for the informed trader's actions by comparing the extremes of uninformative prices versus certain noise trade. We cannot examine the certain noise trade case when uninformed investors consider their price impact because the market breaks down as in Kyle (1989, p. 335) . When there is no uncertainty about noise trade, the price impact matrices i Λ and u Λ become unbounded and both informed and uninformed traders hold positions approaching zero, as can be seen by the inversion of the price impact matrices in (15) and (18).
In the case of price-taking uninformed investors, we have the following corollary:
Proposition 6:
14 Informed traders in Caballé and Krishnan (1994) submit market orders to perfectly competitive market makers.
Their expression for i Λ is equivalent to expression (27) after removing the 1 M M  term and multiplying by one half.
As in Caballé and Krishnan (1994) , it is possible that there exists another, non-symmetric, matrix i Λ satisfying the equilibrium conditions. 15 Alternatively, we could assume that risk-aversion A increases in proportion to the number M of uninformed traders, and take limits as M   . This is analogous to the Kyle's (1989, section 8) analysis of a market with free entry of uninformed traders.
If uninformed traders are price-takers, then as noise trade variance becomes unbounded and price becomes uninformative
As noise trade becomes certain ( ) x  Σ O :
The extreme noise-trade-variance cases of Proposition 6 provide closed-form solutions for i Λ . Note that uninformed traders learn more in the zero-variance case, where the informed trader reveals half of her information. Despite this, the expected returns are higher in the zerovariance case. This occurs because the informed trades approach zero, leaving virtually all of the payoff risk to be borne by uninformed traders. As in Kyle (1989) , the informed trader reduces the size of her positions in such a way that they approach zero, but the price reaction to her trades become large so that there is an impact on what uninformed traders learn. Comparing expected returns in (30) to (29), we see that expected returns are lower in the case where uninformed traders learn nothing. This is because greater noise trade variance induces the informed trader to absorb more risk, which more than compensates for the diminished learning from prices. In the next subsection, we provide a setting in which we demonstrate a monotonic relation between noise trade variance and expected returns.
Trading on information about systematic versus idiosyncratic risks
In section 3, we showed the existence of an equilibrium conditional on the informed trader's price impact matrix i Λ . In this section, we impose some structure on the nature of the 
The N portfolio payoffs of the form k  t v are the principal components of v, which we refer to as 'factors' for the sake of brevity.
We make two assumptions that allow us to derive an expression for i Λ in terms of trade in each factor. This facilitates the separate analysis of trade and information on systematic versus idiosyncratic risks. First, we assume that the covariance matrix of the informed trader's posterior mean i v has the same eigenvectors as v Σ , var( )
In other words, the informed trader's posterior variance, var ( ) ( ) 
Effect of risk aversion and imperfect Effect of informed competition among uninformed trader's absorption of risk 
Consistent with K systematic factors, we assume that the K largest eigenvalues of v Σ become unbounded as the economy grows ( , N M   ). Before taking the large economy limit, we state the following corollary that gives the effect of noise trade variance on expected returns and k  . This effect plays a role in deriving the large-economy expected returns.
Corollary 7.1:
The price impact 
, and
Corollary 7.1 implies that, although noise trades reduce information available to uninformed investors, the increase in the informed trader's risk-absorption dominates. Expected returns therefore decline as the variance of noise trade increases.
In this setting, the effect of distorted risk-sharing is so strong that any private information increases expected returns, as we state in the following corollary: 
The relation between private information ki  and expected returns is non-monotonic;
however, the above corollary shows that expected returns are lower if there was no private information at all. This stands in contrast to settings where all investors are perfectly competitive and any information that increases the average precision of investors' beliefs yields a reduction in expected returns (Lambert et al. 2012 ).
The following proposition characterizes the expected returns and informed holdings in a large economy ( , N M   ).
Proposition 8:
If 
The expected returns on idiosyncratic factors all approach zero and the corresponding informed trade approaches 
 of noise trades remains bounded (becomes unbounded).
Analogous to Proposition 5, Proposition 8 implies that only systematic risks are priced in a large economy. Furthermore, it highlights the key role played by noise traders. In particular, if the set of noise traders who transact in systematic factor portfolios does not grow with the economy, the informed trader has no disguise for her trades. Similar to Corollary 7.1, this drives down the magnitude of informed trades. The proof of Corollary 7.1 shows that the noise in price, 2 kx k   , is increasing in kx  so that noise trades reduce the information available to uninformed traders; however, the effect of reduced risk-absorption by the informed trader dominates. This implies that the sharing of systematic risks depends heavily on the extent to which noise traders transact in diversified portfolios.
Conclusion
Our analysis makes a strong case for concluding that, in a large economy, where idiosyncratic risks are fully diversifiable, effects of imperfect competition with respect to the exploitation of private information on expected returns do not extend beyond systematic risk premia. Borrowing from the principal components approach of Chamberlain (1983) and Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983) , we showed that only systematic risks are priced when competitive uninformed traders are able to fully diversify. We then imposed a standard factor structure for asset payoffs, CARA utility, and normal distributions and derived characterizations of a linear equilibrium in which uninformed traders as well as an informed trader are strategic in setting their demands. Taking the large economy limit, we again found that only systematic risks are priced. Although our characterizations of equilibrium expected returns and informed trades are up to a matrix of price sensitivities to the informed trader's demands, we derived closed-form solutions for a series of special cases lending further efficacy to results in the more general cases.
Notably, adding structure to the nature of the informed trader's private information and noise trades, we again show that only systematic risks are priced. Further insights on the tension between risk absorption and exploitation of private information by the informed trader and implications for expected returns are exhibited by these cases.
A relevant implication for accounting is that in such an idealized setting where the numbers of securities and uninformed investors become very large, strategic speculation on private information and the portion inferred from prices lead to no cross-sectional predictions concerning the impact of imperfect competition with respect to that information. Rather, we suggest that researchers interested in the consequences of accounting policies on cost of capital might find it useful to focus more on cash flow effects of accounting information, so-called "numerator effects". 2) In the limiting economy, there are no redundant securities: inf 0 Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983) and Chamberlain (1983) The expression for C p in (A8), to which return later when solving for i Λ , implies that:
which implicitly defines i Λ . Solving (A8) for c 0 and substituting from (A9) and the solutions for the informed strategy yields:
